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The Smoothing of Reported Corporate earnings through Target 





The setting of earnings targets is frequently used by corporate managers to reduce 
the volatility of reported earnings over successive periods. The practice exemplifies 
the more informal or ad hoc category of income smoothing approaches. This paper 
investigates the volatility reduction potential of target setting relative to the 
underlying (but unobservable) income stream. The analysis uses a simulation 
approach based on a statistical model of accounting measurement that treats periodic 
earnings reports as successive samples drawn from the underlying earnings 
generation process. The results indicate substantial reductions in earnings volatility 
that are remarkably resilient to inaccuracies in targets and increase over reporting 
periods. But accumulating errors due to misalignment between targets and the firm’s 
expected sustainable earnings capacity may produce explosive volatility when 
finally reported - to the detriment of shareholders and other long term stakeholders 





The Smoothing of Reported Corporate earnings through Target 





The smoothing of a firm’s income across successive accounting periods is a 
persistent and pervasive practice of corporate performance (Newman, 1998).  Under 
accrual accounting principles, some forms of earnings smoothing are acceptable, 
even required, of managers. A common example is the systematic allocation of asset 
costs to all relevant periods through the consistent application of time averaging 
depreciation formulae (Lane and Willett, 1998).  
 
But other, less systematic approaches to smoothing reported corporate earnings may 
be less acceptable. This second category of income smoothing approaches is 
characterized by informal or opportunistic adjustments to reported earnings over 
successive periods rather than the systematic application of time averaging cost and 
revenue allocation procedures.  A prime example is the well-established practice of 
earnings target setting (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; DeFond and Park, 1997). 
Management pre-sets earnings targets over successive periods, adjusts actual earnings 
to target and reports the target figures.  
 
Among the managerial benefits of this practice is a potential reduction in the volatility 
of reported income streams over successive periods in an effect known as ‘income 
smoothing’.  Earnings targets are set to dampen down the periodic fluctuations in the 
underlying earnings stream of the firm as reported in the financial statements. Although 
income smoothing across successive periods is only one consideration in setting 
earnings targets, the practice is pervasive and persistent.  
 
Little is known about the effect of target setting on the statistical properties of 
accounting earnings. Willett (1991b) has shown that systematic, time averaging 
methods of cost and revenue allocation across periods can produce significant 
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reductions in the volatility of reported earnings streams. But there is no comparable 
study of less formal approaches. The gap is significant given the current debate over 
the rectitude of earnings management practices involved in several high profile 
corporate collapses. A misalignment between the targets set by management and the 
longer-term sustainable earnings capacity of the firm may bias performance 
reporting to the detriment of the longer term interests of shareholders. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the adjustment of periodic 
corporate earnings streams to pre-set target reduces the volatility of the reported 
earnings streams relative to the unadjusted earnings streams. We investigate this 
smoothing effectiveness both with and without final period corrections for any 
volatility accumulation errors from previous periods. We then examine the influence of 
three conditioning variables on our results – the number of periods in the time horizon, 
the accuracy of management’s knowledge about the firm’s (unobservable) long run 
expected earnings, and the presence of accrual based systematic smoothing in the 
underlying earnings stream.   
 
Our analytical method is based on the principles of statistical accounting measurement 
known as Statistical Activity Cost Theory (SACT) due to Willett (1987) and Lane and 
Willett (1998). This statistical estimation efficiency approach to accounting numbers 
treats reported earnings figures as sample estimates of indirectly derived accounting 
concepts such as long-run expected earnings (LREE) rather than as direct 
measurements of economic concepts. Information content is a function of their 
reliability as sample estimates of the LREE; where reliability refers to the degree of 
dispersion (variance) of the sample earnings figures around the LRE.  In this sense, 
statistical estimation efficiency refers to the degree of volatility of successive 
sample estimates (reported periodic earnings) around the target value - the long run 
expected earnings per period (LREEP). The lower the dispersion of sample 
estimates around the target value, the greater is the estimation efficiency. 
 
In SACT terms, the aim of the paper is to investigate the effect of ad hoc target 
setting on the estimation or inference efficiency of reported income figures where 
these are treated as successive periodic samplings of the underlying corporate 
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income/earnings stream rather than as direct measures of objective economic 
constructs. 
 
Our analysis is organized into five sections. Section two reviews the rationale for 
using target setting as an income smoothing device and the potential for reporting 
conflicts between short run volatility reduction behavior and excessive volatility 
over longer time horizons. Section three explains the general principles of a 
statistical measurement approach to accounting numbers and briefly reviews the 
Statistical Activity Cost Theory (SACT) that we use to computer-generate the 
simulation data in this analysis. Section four presents the simulation results on the 
smoothing effectiveness of target adjusted earnings relative to both un-smoothed and 
systematically smoothed benchmarks.  The implications of the results for future 
research agendas are discussed in section five.  
S 
Earnings Target Setting and Income Smoothing 
Opportunistic smoothing through pre-set targets 
 
DeFond and Park (1997) suggested that the management practice of using 
discretionary accounting choices to smooth reported earnings around some pre-
determined target is accepted as ‘conventional wisdom’ in managerial performance 
reporting.  The strategic exercise of these accrual accounting choices is seen as a 
legitimate, desirable management practice to promote reductions in income stream 
volatility (Yeo, 2002; Magrath and Weld, 2002). Brugstahler and Dichev (1997) 
provide supporting evidence of the extensive use of corporate target setting to 
maintain consistent increases in earnings and to maintain positive earnings (see also 
Weisbach, 1988; Warner et al, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Hayn, 1995). 
 
But these more opportunistic methods of smoothing earnings numbers may be less 
acceptable to corporate regulators, the accounting profession and auditors (Levitt, 
1998; Elias, 2002). Beatty (2002) points out that the deceptive reporting practices in 
many recent, high profile corporate collapses began merely as “ ’legitimate’ ” 
corporate practices of smoothing reported earnings to meet pre-set earnings targets 
rather than intentional deception of stakeholders. Magrath et al (2002) cite 
staggering losses in corporate share value that were kept hidden from stakeholders 
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by similar corporate earnings disclosure practices in the corporate bankruptcies of 
Enron, Lucent Technologies, Cendant, Microstrategy and many other recent high 
profile corporate collapses. Self interest, economic and industry cycles, poor 
management and accumulating gaps between reported and actual earnings may 
pressure management into deceptive earnings management practices to meet 
expected earnings targets (Dutta, 2002; Jaggi, 2002).  
 
Despite these failures, recent studies attest to the continued global persistence of 
accruals management to meet pre-set earnings targets as a pervasive element in 
corporate earnings management and reporting practice (Peasnell, Pope & Young, 
2000b; Mathieu, 2003; see also Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993; Hayn, 1995; 
Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Eddy and Taylor, 1999).  Since corporate valuation is 
determined by the present value of expected future sustainable earnings, target 
setting is often defended as prudent and necessary both as a relative performance 
exercise and for identifying the desirable level of reported earnings (Richardson and 
Wu, 2002).  
 
A common theme in many studies is the coincidence between earnings target setting 
and the short-run nature of managerial self-interest. De Fond and Parker (1997) 
suggest that the time frame of managerial self-interest rarely exceed two to three 
reporting periods. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) also found that managerial self-
interest appears to emphasize reporting satisfactory results for the current and the 
next period, rather than long-term performance reporting.  
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) also found that present earnings targets are 
predominantly set on manager’s expectations of next period’s earnings. Manager’s 
self-interest appears to emphasize reporting satisfactory results for the current and 
the next period, rather than long-term performance reporting. Managers may set 
targets for current year discretionary accruals at least partially in anticipation of 
future earnings, but they tend only to consider immediate future expected earnings 
when setting earnings or profit targets. However, Richardson and Waegelein (2002) 
express a contrary view. They provide evidence that long-term corporate 
performance considerations and plans can impact on earnings management 
practices.   
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If managers emphasize short-term performance horizons, finance theory holds that 
shareholders typically adopt a longer term view of company sustainable 
performance. Current models of corporate valuation discount a firm’s expected 
sustainable earnings over a much longer time horizons than manager’s self-interest 
time frames - into perpetuity, or at least, the foreseeable future. In this context, the 
value of successive periodic earnings reports to external stakeholders becomes a 
function of the information they convey about the firm’s sustainable earnings and 
dividend capacity over time as well as the income of discrete (but artificial) 
accounting periods.  
 
In this sense, the shorter-term nature of managerial self-interest may conflict with 
shareholder’s interests, which span a much longer time horizon in relation to a 
firm’s intrinsic, sustainable earnings capacity. If opportunistic target setting and 
achievement practices merely hide reported earnings volatility by accumulating it 
into later periods then the practice may deceive shareholders and other readers of 
corporate reports about the sustainable level and behavior of the company’s earnings 
capacity over time. We now investigate these propositions using a statistical 
measurement theory approach to accounting numbers. 
 
Does target setting produce effective income smoothing? 
As early as 1969, Lev asserted that setting periodic earnings targets should enable 
managers to effectively minimize the volatility of successive earnings estimates 
(Lev, 1969). An earnings target is set for each period. Any residual difference in 
actual performance is then adjusted to target levels through discretionary accrual 
accounting choices. The procedure is repeated over successive periods. The only 
structural limit to variance reduction is the capacity of managers to find sufficient 
accrual choices to achieve the necessary earnings adjustments and their ability to set 
targets that accurately reflects the long run parameter of interest.  
 
Counter-balancing these gains are three sources of error that may, over time, exceed 
the volatility of the unadjusted earnings figures - (i) differences between actual and 
target earnings that accumulate over successive periods, (ii) differences between the 
pre-set periodic targets and the adjusted earnings figures, and (iii) differences 
between periodic targets and the long-run parameter of interest due to inaccurate 
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forecasting of the LREEPP. The first item is the major source of error or correction. 
The latter two factors represent sources of residual volatility in smoothed estimates 
over the short run.  
 
Where these actual-to-target earnings adjustments offset each other over successive 
periods they are zero sum processes. But the ad hoc nature of setting successive 
periodic earnings targets is more likely to result in non-zero sum processes where 
the net adjustments accumulate over successive periods. In such cases, any 
apparent reduction of volatility relative to unadjusted earnings may not be 
eliminated, but just shifted into later periods where it keeps accumulating until 
offset or corrected in a later period.  
 
Managers may delay correction of the accumulating net adjustments for several 
reporting periods. But, at some stage, they will have to reveal the true state of the 
firm’s actual earnings record and reconcile it with the reported earnings situation. 
From anecdotal evidence we suspect that delayed correction for the accumulating 
unadjusted-to-target differences may create explosive volatility in the adjustment 
period. The correction may then outweigh previous gains in estimation efficiency - 
to the detriment of shareholders and other stakeholders with longer-term interests in 
corporate performance.  
 
METHOD   
A Statistical Measurement Framework 
 
Investigation of the earnings smoothing dynamics of target setting over time 
requires an approach to accounting measurement that focuses on the statistical 
properties of earnings numbers. In this study, we use Statistical Activity Cost 
Theory (SACT) due to Willett, (1987, 1988) and Lane and Willett, (1993). SACT is 
an axiomatic measurement approach to the consistent ranking of accounting 
numbers on quantifiable criteria (Lane and Willett, 1993; Willett, 1987, 1988).  
 
This statistical measurement approach was used by Willett (1987, 1988) to examine 
the smoothing efficiency of time averaging cost procedures that are common in 
accrual accounting. Hillier and McCrae (2000) also used the approach to generate 
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data in a simulation study that compared the earnings smoothing efficiency of 
alternative depreciation methods.  
 
SACT treats reported earnings figures as indirect accounting measurements that 
provide successive samples of the underlying earnings generation process where the 
main interest is on the long run average value of that process (Willett, 1991b). These 
sample estimates make up the transactional database of accounting numbers that 
summaries the firm’s on-going transaction based activities. Each period’s reported 
earnings figure represents a sample estimate of the firm’s long-run expected 
earnings rather than a direct calculation of an economic construct. These sample 
estimates are then used to make inferences about the accounting measures of 
performance over time; for instance long term expected earnings, profitability or 
cash surplus/deficit.  
 
Under the statistical inference approach to accounting measurement, the information 
content of accounting numbers relates directly to their statistical efficiency in 
representing the long-run accounting measure of interest. In the present case, the 
volatility of the periodic earnings figures can be used as a measure of their 
efficiency as estimators of the long run expected or average earnings per period of 
the firm. A decline in this sample variance will reduce uncertainty and increase 
estimation efficiency. An increase in the volatility of these sample estimates will 
produce the opposite effect (Brief and Owen, 1970; Gibbins and Willett, 1997; Hillier 
and McCrae, 2000).  
 
This statistical inference approach provides both a consistent axiomatic foundation 
for accounting measurement and precise benchmarks for comparing the information 
content of reported accounting numbers produced under alternative accounting 
methods.  The desirability of systematic or unsystematic methods of earnings 
smoothing is now ranked by their capacity to increase the statistical efficiency of the 
sampling estimates. Smoothing practices that reduce the variance of the resulting 
earnings samples increase their efficiency as sample estimators of long run expected 
earnings per period. Volatility or variance provides a measure of estimation 
uncertainty around the parameter of interest (Brief and Owen, 1970; Gibbins and 
Willett, 1997).  Under this approach, some types of earnings management may, in 
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fact, improve the statistical properties of accounting numbers where these are taken 
as sample estimates of the parameter of interest (Gibbins and Willett, 1997; 
Gonedes, 1972). 
 
Our analytical framework adopts the SACT approach of Lane and Willett (1993) as 
formulated in Hillier and McCrae (1999).  The SACT accounting earnings function 
treats accounting numbers as arising from transactions that create activities over the 
reporting period with characteristic starting, finishing and duration times, and 
characteristic costs and revenues distributions. All these characteristics are stochastic 
in the sense that, over time, they derive from random variable probability distributions 
unique to that firm or industry both in terms of form of distribution and unique 
moments (Willett 1987, 1989) 
 
The earnings function is converted to a computer program allowing simulation 
experiments over various functional forms and distributions of cost and revenue 
determining variables. The basic transactional unit is the ‘activity’. Cost and revenue 
observations for each activity are sampled from specified distributions for each 
variable. The sampling distributions for number, starting times, durations, costs and 
revenues of activities can be chosen to represent the unique firm or industry production 
characteristics.  These firm-specific characteristics determine the parameter values of 
the earnings function that is used to generate sample estimates of earnings for a 
nominated horizon of reporting periods. The periodic earnings contributions of 
simulated activities are then accumulated on both an unadjusted earnings and a target 
adjusted periodic earnings basis.  
 
The simulations 
A simulation program yielded sampling estimates per reporting period for target-
adjusted earnings, unadjusted earnings and systematically smoothed earnings. Each 
run contained 100 revenue/cost generating activities spread over the chosen time 
horizon. Each trial consists of 1000 runs. So, each trial yields 100,000-point sample 




A sample earnings variance reduction ratio (SEVRR) is then calculated for each of the 
three variance types.    The SEVRR computes the ratio of the variances for target-
adjusted earnings (numerator) to unadjusted earnings variance or systematically 
smoothed earnings respectively.   This ratio is used as a measure of the absolute 
smoothing effectiveness of target adjusted earnings relative to unadjusted and 
systematically smoothed earnings streams.  
 
Conditioning factors. 
We also examine the sensitivity of variance reduction results to three conditioning 
factors. These are: (i) the number of period in time horizon, (ii) the variations in the 
accuracy of target setting and (iii) the use of systematically smoothed earnings as a 
benchmark in place of ‘unadjusted’ periodic earnings. 
 
RESULTS 
There are four sets of results for the simulation trials.  Sets one and two compare the 
variances of target-adjusted periodic earnings against the variance of the equivalent 
unadjusted earnings as the benchmark for variance reduction. The first set of results 
excludes any end-period adjustment for accumulated differences between actual 
earnings and target earnings over the preceding (0-(T-1)) periods. The second set 
includes the end period adjustments to offset any accumulated differences. Sets three 
and four repeat the analysis using the variance of systematically smoothed earnings as 
the benchmark for estimation efficiency. Set three again excludes any end-period 
adjustment. Set four includes any adjustment. Set four includes adjustments of 
accumulated errors. 
 
The results also include two further conditioning factors that may influence the 
degree of variance change: (i) the number of reporting periods and (ii) the degree of 
accuracy of management’s knowledge about the firm’s long run expected earnings 
potential.  
 
The results are presented in seven tables. Tables two through five report the VRR 
relative to unadjusted earnings and systematically adjusted earnings figures.  The 
variances reflect the spread or distribution of the reported earnings per period around 
long run expected earnings. Tables six and seven show the differences in these ratios 
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between two variance reduction benchmarks – unadjusted earnings and 
systematically smoothed earnings variances. 
 
 
Robustness of variance ratio results. 
Before running the simulation trials we needed to test the uniformity of simulated 
reduction results over separate trials. Significant differences between trials may create 
problems for later testing. We ran 10 trials with 100,000 point sample estimates per 
trial. Each trial has 1000 runs with 100 earnings generating activities per run spread 
over the horizon. Each run is based on 100 revenue/cost generating activities. We then 
compared the trials with the highest and lowest VRR values. Uniformity is measured 
by (i) the absolute difference in VRR between the two trials and (ii) the absolute 
difference standardized by the average variance reduction value over the ten trails. 
Table one shows the results. On both measures, the differences in VRR values 
between trials not significantly different from zero which eliminates differences 
between trial results as a source of error in results. 
Smoothing Effectiveness - Unadjusted Earnings Variance Benchmark 
 Set 1 - No End Period Correction  
 The first set of results omits any final period correction of accumulated adjustments 
between actual earnings and target earnings over previous periods.  Table two and 
Figure two report the variance reduction between target-adjusted earnings and 
unadjusted earnings per period excluding the end period adjustment for accumulated 
(target-unadjusted) differences from previous {0 – (T-1)} periods.  The body of 
table two gives the VRR values for lengthening time horizons and decreasing 
accuracy of each period’s target relative to the expected long-run earnings value. So, 
for instance, over a two period horizon and 10 percent target inaccuracy each period, 
the target-smoothed earnings per period variance is 18.25 percent of the unadjusted 
earnings variance; 81.75 percent of the benchmark variance is removed by target 
smoothing.  
The results indicate that managers can give the appearance of large reductions in the 
variance of corporate earnings streams by reporting target earnings rather than 
unadjusted earnings per period, even where periodic earnings targets set by 
management are relatively inaccurate estimators of long run earnings. Over a four 
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period horizon, target-adjusted earnings remove over 60 per cent of the variance for 
unadjusted earnings (Table 2). 
 
The size of this variance reduction is relatively immune to reasonable levels of target 
inaccuracy in terms of management’s ability to infer the firm’s sustainable earning 
capability. Accurate target estimation of long run earnings by managers apparently 
removes most of the earnings variance from a wide range of T period time horizons. A 
target error of five percent relative to LRE still removes 95% of unadjusted earnings 
variance over a two period horizon (Table 2). Even 20 per cent target inaccuracy still 
results in a 74 per cent reduction in unadjusted earnings variance for a two period 
horizon However, target levels in excess of 25% estimation error of LREEPP start to 
exponentially erode estimating efficiencies (Table 2, Figure 2). 
 
The number of periods in a time horizon also influences the size of variance reduction 
at each level of target accuracy. Variance reductions increase as the time horizon 
expands, although at a decreasing rate. Over two, four and 10 period horizons the 
variance of target adjusted earnings decreases to under 18, 11 and 8 per cent of 
unadjusted earnings variances respectively (Table 2, Figure 2).    
 
These results suggest that managers can apparently smooth reported earnings 
streams by reporting pre-set target levels in successive periods over fairly long time 
horizons and target accuracies, relative to the parameter of estimation interest. But 
these increases in statistical estimation efficiencies may be more apparent than real.   
 
Set 2 - With End Period Correction 
Where the actual-to-target adjustments accumulate over T periods, an earnings 
correction must be reported in period T to offset the accumulated target adjustments 
in the previous [0-(T-1)] periods. The second set of results includes this final period 
correction. Table three reports the variance reduction ratio that includes an end 
period correction for the accumulated differences between unadjusted and target 
earnings levels.  The reversal of results between tables 2 and 3 is dramatic. For a two 
period horizon and 10 percent target inaccuracy the variance has now increased by 
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153.18 percent relative to the benchmark variance as opposed to the 8 percent 
decrease in Table 1. 
 
These initial results confirm our suspicion that opportunistic smoothing may merely 
shift accumulated errors between target and actual earnings into later periods rather 
than eliminate it. This possibility now introduces a contrary influence.  Time horizon 
expansion may increase volatility reduction but it may also increases the size of the 
terminal period correction per period when reconciling the targeted and earnings 
estimates over the T period time horizon. The end period correction, when reported, 
may exceed the estimation efficiencies of the previous [0-(T-1)] periods.  
 
Table 3 shows that inclusion of end period error corrections creates estimation 
variance inefficiencies over all time horizons and all degrees of target accuracy - 
relative to the variance of the unadjusted sample earnings estimates. The inclusion 
of end period corrections causes reversals of volatility reduction into excess 
volatility. Even when targets accurately reflect LRE, target volatility still exceeds 
unadjusted earnings variance.  
 
Lengthening the time horizon 
This excess volatility grows dramatically over the number of periods in a time horizon.  
Even with small target errors, the 13.8 per cent increase in estimation variance for two 
periods rises to 22.6 per cent over four periods (Tables 3). More periods imply both 
additional (target-actual) adjustments to offset, and the increasing likelihood that 
targets will deviate from the evolving LREEPP; thus introducing another source of 
error.  So the horizon end correction becomes progressively larger due to increasing 
target error and accumulated adjustments error (unadjusted to target) over time. As 
mentioned, over a two-period horizon, excess volatility is 13% over actual earnings. 
But at ten periods, the volatility has increased by 1.621 times the volatility of the 
unadjusted earnings.  
 
The increased volatility is actually spread over all periods. But target setting delays the 
effects and cumulates them into the last period of the time horizon. For instance, Table 
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3 shows that over a 5 period horizon, the reported target incomes in the first four 
periods will give financial statement readers the impression of stable earnings around a 
persistent longer term earnings potential. But this is more than offset in period 5 by the 
sudden dramatic adjustment to income as managers offset the cumulative adjustments 
and target error in previous periods. The longer this apparently stable target based 
income stream is reported the worse will be the accumulated but delayed adjustment in 
the last period of the time horizon (Table 3). 
 
Increased Target Error  
The excess volatility may be intensified by the likelihood of target estimation errors 
due to a manager’s lack of knowledge about future cost and revenue parameter 
values, future activity levels and expectations about LREEPP values. Managers’ 
targets are likely to over- or under- shooting LREEPP; especially where short-term 
considerations are their main focus.  When final period corrections are included 
(scenario 2), the excess volatility is extremely sensitive to the degree of target error 
relative to the long run parameter. As error increases so does the resultant excess 
volatility. Table three shows that a target inaccuracy of five percent over a six period 
horizon results increases benchmark variance by 154.28 percent. At 20 percent 
target inaccuracy this inefficiency is 4.2553 times the unadjusted earnings variance.  
 
A conjunction of increasing target error and time horizon periods compounds both 
effects (Table3 and Figure 3) and leads to a significant increase in relative variance 
ratios at larger numbers of periods. A target error of 20% per period over 6 periods 
increases the REVR to 4.26 times the actual earnings variance. Over10 periods, the 
same REVR value increased to 4.34 time’s actual earnings variance  
 
Over these multi-period time horizons, financial statement readers would observe a 
smoothed reported income with less volatility than the actual (but unobservable) 
earnings figures over 5 and 9 periods respectively. But these reported targets are 
deceptive as an estimate of LREE. They hide the cumulative error introduced by 
target error and adjustment error. The sixth and tenth periods respectively would see 
a dramatic adjustment in reported earnings as managers offset these cumulative 
target errors.  
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Of course, managers may minimize offset effects by backing it out gradually over 
time. During down turns and recessions, the market expects poor results and is less 
likely to be surprised or condemn poor performance. These negative expectations 
give managers the opportunity to periodically compensate for prior upward earnings 
adjustments without hurting their own self-interest too much.  
 
Sets 3 and 4 - Systematic Smoothing Bench-mark 
Corporate earnings streams contain a degree of systematic, time averaging in 
cost and revenue streams; that is, the systematic allocation of costs and revenues to 
successive periods according to a deterministic model.  Accrual accounting principles 
mandate these systematic smoothing methods for the calculation of periodic earnings 
estimates Willett, (1991) and Hillier and McCrae, (1999) show that cost and revenue 
allocations through such time averaging techniques as depreciation, amortization, debt 
and goodwill provisions increase estimation efficiency of unadjusted earnings streams 
over a wide range of conditions, including time horizons, allocation methods and 
managers’ knowledge states. So comparing ad hoc smoothing techniques against a 
systematically smoothed earnings benchmark is arguably more appropriate than an 
unadjusted earnings volatility benchmark.  
 
Establishing the relative estimating efficiencies of the two alternative methods is also a 
worthwhile exercise from the perspectives of managers, shareholders, regulators and 
other stakeholders. The comparison permits a relative ranking of measurement 
efficiency of two systems on unambiguous, consistent and quantifiable measurement 
criteria.  
 
 Set 3 - No End Period Correction 
The results in this set compare the variance of target-adjusted earnings with that of 
systematically smoothed earnings streams excluding any end period correction. The 
results are reported in Table 4 and Figure 4. The body of Table four is the same as for 
Table two, except that the benchmark is now the variance of systematically smoothed 
earnings.  
 
The comparative results are remarkably similar as shown in Table five which shows 
the difference in variance reduction between the two benchmarks.  Table five combines 
 17
Tables two and four. Tables five (and Table seven) compare that variance of target-
adjusted earnings against an unadjusted earnings variance benchmark, with the same 
ratio against the systematically smoothed earnings variance benchmark.  Negative cell 
numbers indicate that variance reductions (increases) of target-adjusted earnings 
against the unadjusted earnings variance benchmark variance are greater (smaller) 
than for the systematically smoothed earnings variance benchmark.   Positive cell 
numbers indicate the reverse situation. 
 
The results indicate that the estimation efficiency improvements against systematically 
smoothed volatility benchmarks are only 1 to 3 per cent less than for the non-smoothed 
benchmarks (Table 5). The comparison suggests that the sample earnings estimation 
efficiency gains from targeting are not greatly affected by the choice of benchmark 
earnings streams. A not unreasonable result since the maximum potential efficiency 
gains is a reduction of earnings variance to zero in the case of absolute target accuracy 
or to extremely low levels of variance about the long run expected earnings at 
reasonable levels of target accuracy (up to 10% difference). In these cases, the starting 
benchmark variance is somewhat immaterial. 
 
Set 4 - With End Period Correction 
Set four results include end period corrections for any accumulated variance in 
previous periods. The variance reduction ratio values between target adjusted and 
systematically smoothed earnings are given in Table 6.  
 
The body of table six shows the ratio values over lengthening time horizons and 
varying target accuracy levels.  Figure six gives a visual representation of the 
results. The general pattern of results is similar to the unadjusted earnings 
benchmark case. The inclusion of the end period correction now creates statistically 
significant excess volatility (at the 5 percent confidence interval) rather than 
volatility reduction. The volatility increase is observed at all levels of target 
accuracy and across all time horizons. The strength and similarity of this outcome 
over the two volatility benchmarks implies that adjustment to target does not reduce 
the inherent volatility relative to unadjusted earnings estimates. The differences just 
accumulate over successive periods until correction in some ‘final’ period of the 
horizon (Tables 6).  
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But the pattern is intensified for the systematically smoothed benchmark case. 
Increases in excess volatility over identical horizons and target accuracy are 
significantly greater than for the unadjusted earnings benchmark. Table 7 compares 
the variance reductions under the two benchmarks (Table three with Table six). 
Negative cell numbers again indicate that variance increases for of target-adjusted 
against smoothed earnings are greater than for the unadjusted earnings variance 
benchmark.  Positive cell numbers indicate the reverse situation. 
The differences are highly significant at the 5 per cent confidence interval. Even a 
two period time horizon with relatively accurate targets (110% of LREEPP) gives a 
20% absolute difference in SEVRR.  
 
Excess volatility the smoothed earnings case (scenario 4) increases more than 
monotonically with expanding time horizons and increased inaccuracy of targets 
relative to LREEPP.  At less accurate target levels (160% to 180% of LREEPP) and 
longer time horizons (8 to 10 periods) the differences become increasingly larger. 
For these longer horizons, the excess volatility against the systematically smoothed 
earnings benchmark from 24 percent to 80 percent larger than the excess volatility 
against the unadjusted earnings benchmark (Table 7). 
 
Results Summary 
To summarise, when reported periodic earnings are treated as sample estimates of 
long run expected earnings per period, managers can apparently use earnings targets 
to reduce the volatility of unadjusted earnings estimates. This variance reduction can 
be both dramatic and fairly robust to target error of up to 10-5 percent. The 
reduction increases with additional reporting periods. However, the volatility 
reduction may be more apparent than real since it assumes either (i) that successive 
target adjustments are offsetting or (ii) that managers can hide the implied correction 
needed to offset accumulating differences over successive periods. When managers 
are forced to disclose an end period correction, the smoothing results are 
dramatically reversed. Earnings estimates are now more volatile. This excess 
volatility is sensitive both to target error and to lengthening time horizons. 
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A broadly similar pattern emerges when the benchmark for volatility reduction is 
changed to the variance of systematically smoothed earnings. As long as the end 
period correction is excluded, the volatilities of reported earnings estimates appear 
to reduce substantially. The reductions have low sensitivity to target error, up to 10-
15 percent of LREEP. Volatility reduction increases with time. The inclusion of end 
period corrections for accumulated (target-actual earnings) errors also results in 
excess volatility. 
 
But here the similarities end. The comparison between the two benchmarks in Table 
seven illustrates the dramatic change. Excess volatilities are significantly larger than 
for the unadjusted earnings benchmark at all time horizons and target inaccuracy 
levels. They are also are more sensitive to target error size and time horizon length. 
The result is significant since, under accrual accounting principles, systematically 
smoothed earnings and profit streams are required procedures in corporate financial 
performance estimation and reporting. Earnings estimation on accrual accounting 
principles appears particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of ad hoc or 
opportunistic methods of smoothing income streams. 
 
These results raise concern for corporate, accounting and audit regulators and for 
stakeholders since accrual accounting is the mandatory form of corporate 
accounting. Accrual accounting streams are dominated by time averaging of costs 
and revenues. Yet such systematically smoothed income streams appear to be more 




Our approach to the measurement accuracy of periodic reported earnings figures differs 
from the traditional ‘valuation’ based measurement approach adopted by accounting 
standard setters and regulators. Under SACT, periodic accounting performance 
numbers are not seen as direct, representations of the underlying production processes 
of the firm, but rather as sample estimates of a firm’s economic transactions over 
successive accounting periods based on indirect or derived accounting concepts that 
only indirectly represent the results of those transactions. Each reported figure is a 
sample estimate of the parameter of interest over the reporting horizon – for instance, 
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sustainable earnings. Alternative methods of opportunistic or ‘ad hoc’ income 
smoothing through alternative accrual accounting choices are then ranked by their 
ability to reduce sample estimation variance in representing the earnings parameter of 
interest.  
 
The results show that managers can substantially lower the variances of successive 
reported earnings figures (relative to unadjusted figures) if they set earnings targets, 
adjust actual earnings to these targets and ignore any accumulating errors. This 
variance reduction increases with the number of periods. The results are even fairly 
robust against inaccuracies in managers’ target setting accuracy relative to the long 
run parameter of interest – up to 15 per cent inaccuracy.   
 
However, if managers continually set targets that differ substantially from the 
expected sustainable earnings (e.g. over 20 per cent error), then the estimation 
variance quickly exceeds the variance of unadjusted estimates in a non-linear 
fashion. This excess is magnified when LRE follows a growth (decline) rather than a 
constant path over successive reporting periods. Such large or persistent levels of 
target inaccuracy may motivate managers to redress the imbalance, since at 
significant levels of error, the speed of volatility increase relates to error size. Errors 
can quickly accumulate out of control.   
 
In a recent study, Ioannidis, Peel and Reel (2003) also propose the potential non-
linearity of corporate target ratio adjustment to error size.  Drawing on the time 
series properties of financial ratios work by Tippett (1990), Tippett and Whittington 
(1995) and Whittington and Tippett, (1999), they suggest that the rate of adjustment 
of ratios to their optimal value is an increasing function of deviation from target. 
Within a range of small error, managers may refrain from target adjustment, but 
outside a certain error range they may become increasingly concerned with the size 
of potential error adjustments and take more dramatic and speedier remedial action 
as discrepancies grow larger (p. 701).   
 
The inclusion of a terminal period correction for any accumulated errors creates a 
different situation.  Estimation efficiency relative to unadjusted earnings is reduced 
over all time horizons (even just 2 periods), all expectation states about LREEPP and 
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all target error levels.  This inefficiency gets worse as more periods are added, as 
managers’ forecasts of expected LREEPP become less accurate and as target setting 
errors increase relative to the expected LREEPP.  
Our results have direct implications for future regulation of accounting earnings 
reporting. They show that such ad hoc practices as setting periodic earnings targets and 
then using accounting choices to artificially attain those targets can give the illusion of 
stable income streams by shifting the earnings volatility into subsequent reporting 
periods. The real underlying volatility is kept hidden by simply delaying the correction 
of the accumulating target to actual earnings errors until some regulatory or 
circumstantial factor forces disclosure.  At this point, shareholders and other external 
stakeholders suddenly discover the accumulated earnings volatility from previous 
periods.  
 
Several national corporate and accounting regulators emphasise the need for greater 
vigilance against the accounting standards manipulation as the most effective tool 
against future abusive earnings management and fraudulent accounting practices 
(Jenkins, 2002; SEC, 2003; Magrath and Weld, 2002). But as Vinciguerra, & 
O'Reilly-Allen (2004) emphasise, the difficulty is the separation of earnings 
management practices that fall within accepted corporate practice from those that 
are considered contrary to the intention of accounting and corporate reporting 
regulation. 
Not all earnings management practices are necessarily fraudulent. Discretionary 
choice under accrual accounting principles creates a spectrum of alternative 
corporate accounting strategies – from conservative accounting through positive and 
‘creative’ accounting, onto misleading accounting, deliberately deceptive accounting 
and finally fraudulent accounting practices. Conservative strategies include 
systematic ‘time averaging’ forms of cost and revenue allocation. The opportunistic 
type of discretionary adjustments to periodic reported earnings may be less 
acceptable. Even discretionary adjustment of corporate periodic earnings to meet 
pre-set earnings targets through accrual (or other) choices, may, over time, lead to 
deceptive corporate reporting. 
 
We have limited discussion of opportunistic or ‘add hoc’ earnings smoothing 
techniques to pre-setting targets because of its wide acceptance as an established part of 
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earnings management and ‘good’ corporate governance.  Our concern is with the effect 
of income smoothing techniques on the statistical properties of reported earnings 
numbers. But the results are so decisive as to suggest that corporate regulators, 
accounting standard setters and those charged with overseeing good corporate 
governance need to consider the implications of a statistical estimation approach to 
accounting numbers for detection of deceptive reporting practices in relation to 
performance indicators. For instance, knowing that income smoothing is a widely used 
corporate reporting practice is one thing, being able to tell when such manipulation of 
periodic results has occurred is quite another. There is still relative little work on the 
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Variance ratio trial accuracy: Target adjusted/unadjusted Earnings 
variance differences for two extreme values in a ten trial series 
(with end period correction} 
Extreme Periods 
Trials 2 Pds  4Pds   6Pds  8Pds  10Pds  
 Var VarDiff Var VarDiff Var VarDiff Var  VarDiff Var VarDiff. 
4 1.1   1.238   1.432   1.492   1.604  
8 1.176 0.076 1.215 0.023 1.407 0.025 1.438 0.055 1.639 0.034 
 
Average  0.066*  0.019*  0.017*  0.037*  0.0212* 
 




























































Variance Reduction  Ratios: Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Earnings
Increasing time horizons, Decreasing target accuracy for  LREEP
















Variance Reduction  Ratios: Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Earnings 
Increasing time horizons, Decreasing target accuracy for LREEP 
(without end period  correction) 
 
Periods Target Accuracy in Estimating LREEP 
in Horizon 100% 105% 110% 115% 120% 140% 160% 
2 0.0000 0.0492 0.1825 0.4608 0.7313 3.0781 7.2705 
4 0.0000 0.0376 0.1428 0.3381 0.5919 2.4072 5.3816 
6 0.0000 0.0291 0.1127 0.2569 0.453 1.8277 4.115 
8 0.0000 0.0227 0.0863 0.2021 0.3509 1.4289 3.1988 

















Variance Reduction  Ratio: Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Earnings 
Increasing time horizons, Decreasing target accuracy for LREEP 




in Horizon 100% 105% 110% 115% 120% 140% 160% 
2 1.0966 1.1603 1.5318 2.1056 2.5059 7.443 15.4091 
4 1.3099 1.4172 1.7737 2.7183 3.5999 10.818 22.5547 
6 1.4054 1.5428 2.0027 2.9088 4.2553 12.2354 26.2543 
8 1.5629 1.6424 2.0741 3.1043 4.1009 12.9996 27.1467 













Variance Reduction  Ratios: Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Earnings
Increasing time horizons, Decreasing target accuracy for LREEP











Variance Reduction Ratio:Target Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings 
RVP Expectation State 
Increasing periods, decreasing target accuracy for LREEP 
(without end period  correction) 
%LREPP Periods 
In Horizon 1.0000 1.05% 1.10% 1.15% 120% 140% 160% 
2 0.0000 0.0527 0.1947 0.4634 0.7771 3.3455 8.0054 
4 0.0000 0.0472 0.1831 0.4292 0.7493 2.9428 7.0521 
6 0.0000 0.0419 0.1687 0.3766 0.6682 2.7627 6.1062 
8 0.0000 0.036 0.1377 0.3249 0.5542 2.2742 5.22 































Variance Reduction Ratio:Target Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings 
RVP Expectation State 
Increasing periods, decreasing accuracy 

















Difference in Variance Reduction  Ratios for two Benchmarks - Unadjusted & Smoothed Earnings 
(Table  2 v. Table 4) 
Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Ratios versus Target-Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings Ratios 
(without end period correction) 
%LREEPP 
1.00% 1.10% 120% 140% 160% 
Average Difference Average Difference  Average Difference Average Difference  Average Difference  
-0.0035 -0.0122 -0.0458 -0.2674 -0.7349 
-0.0096 -0.0403 -0.1574 -0.5356 -1.6705 
-0.0128 -0.056 -0.2152 -0.935 -1.9912 
-0.0133 -0.0514 -0.2033 -0.8453 -2.0212 










Variance Reduction Ratio: Target Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings 
Increasing Periods, Decreasing target Accuracy for LREEP 
(with end period correction) 
 
Periods % LREEPP 
in Horizon 100% 105% 110% 115% 120% 140% 160% 
2 1.2218 1.45961 1.7335 2.3532 2.7583 8.136 17.0249 
4 2.0635 2.1864 2.6768 3.5861 4.9836 13.6009 29.6903 
6 2.692 2.7342 3.5579 4.8001 6.9906 18.7432 39.4236 
8 3.4248 3.8112 4.3289 6.1528 7.6123 21.65 45.4348 




















Variance Reduction Ratio: Target Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings
Increasing periods, Decreasing target Accuracy for LREEP





















Difference in Variance Reduction  Ratios for two Benchmarks - Unadjusted & Smoothed Earnings 
(Table  3 v. Table 6) 
Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Ratios versus Target-Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings Ratios 
(with end period correction) 
%LREEPP 
Periods 1.00% 1.10% 120% 140% 160% 
 Average Difference Average Difference  Average Difference Average Difference 
Average 
Difference  
2 -0.1252 -0.2 -0.25 -0.693 -1.6158 
4 -0.7536 -0.9 -1.38 -2.783 -7.1356 
6 -1.2866 -1.56 -2.74 -6.508 -13.1693 
8 -1.8619 -2.25 -3.51 -8.65 -18.2881 
10 -2.4582 -2.97 -5.16 -13.84 -23.2131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
